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Article
Background
Only a few days after 9/11, U.S. troops were deployed to the 
Middle East (South-West Asia) to begin preparing their cam-
paign against the terrorist group responsible for destroying 
New York City’s World Trade Center. Approximately 13 years 
after this military buildup, this War is expected to be drawing 
to a close as Afghans will now take the primary role of security 
(Lila, 2013). Billions of dollars were spent in fighting the war, 
but the effectiveness of this effort has not yet been accurately 
assessed. Although assessments have been accomplished, they 
are questionable in their reliability and validity (Downs-
Martin, 2011). In addition, the analysis of data is limited and 
attempts to forecast (Downs-Martin, 2011). The complexity of 
assessing the Afghan War is founded in the fact that the U.S. 
population is hopeful. Spending record amounts on defense, 
the U.S. population should be hopeful that they are “buying” 
something of value. Yet, as Downs-Martin (2011) argues, cur-
rent assessments using past and present data to determine 
some future accomplishment are dubious.
Introduction
This article focuses on assessing the military in combat oper-
ations in Afghanistan. To accomplish this, the military is 
defined and a review of literature that quantifies and assesses 
military operations in Afghanistan follows. This article then 
discusses the impact of the Afghan War on the Afghan people 
and offers evidence of the widespread impact the Afghan War 
had on civilians. An analysis and discussion of enemy engage-
ments in Afghanistan follows and focuses on the casualties of 
war as a measure of military effectiveness.
The Counter-Terrorism Industry’s Purpose
The U.S. military in its current state, including the 
Department of Defense (DoD), has established infrastruc-
ture that is far more advanced than the rudimentary infra-
structure necessary in late 2001. These resources come at 
an increasing cost. Advanced weapons, aircraft, surveil-
lance systems, and other countless associated pieces of 
equipment are bought and paid for by the American people. 
Therefore, the American people have a right to know how 
their resources have been used. Such transparency is pur-
ported by some government officials, but others character-
ize the U.S. Government’s transparency as being little more 
than smoke and mirrors. Before an assessment can be made, 
the definition and purpose of the military must be defined. 
This may seem a simple task, but when one considers the 
vast array of military institutions, their operations, and 
the public’s perceptions of what the military should do, the 
mission of the military becomes less clear. This study will 
refer to the U.S. Armed Forces as the “military” and reflect 
only the decisions within the span of military commanders. 
Thus, political forces and intent are not the focus of this 
assessment, but rather the actions and decisions of the U.S. 
Armed Forces.
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Abstract
Spending almost US$700 billion to combat insurgents in Afghanistan, the U.S. population should be hopeful that they “bought” 
something of value as the Afghan War concludes. This exploratory study focuses on evaluating operations within Afghanistan 
by accounting for enemy and civilian losses. Integration of civilian losses offers an opportunity to evaluate operations that 
represent societal losses to the Afghan people. Regression estimates using zero-inflated negative-binomial models indicate 
that military operations resulted in more civilian casualties than enemy losses.
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The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 
published in March 2013, defines the purpose of the armed 
forces as such:
The US Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, defending 
the US against all adversaries while serving the Nation as a 
bulwark and the guarantor of its security and independence. The 
US Armed Forces function within the American system of civil-
military relations and serve under the civilian control of the 
President, the Commander in Chief. The US Armed Forces 
embody the highest values and standards of American society 
and the profession of arms. (U.S. Army, 2013, p. i)
Today’s military is embroiled in a war far different than the 
wars that shaped the structure, culture, and traditions of the 
U.S. military. The men and women of the military are trained 
to survive and win under war conditions. Nation-building 
and community policing are not the primary objectives for 
which members of the military are trained. The objectives of 
military basic training may be considered a clear representa-
tion of what the military expects from members; they are a 
reflection of what leaders demand to be instilled in all ser-
vice members. Although each branch of service in the U.S. 
Military (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines) differs by method 
and training needs, they do share many similar characteris-
tics. Military training certainly emphasizes physical fitness, 
but a large component of basic training is changing the way 
the trainee thinks. Military ethics, values, discipline, and tra-
dition ensure that trainees will obey commands and respect 
the chain of command. Field training exercises (FTX) and 
rifle/handgun training both ensure that the trainee is prepared 
for battle. FTX are designed to mimic austere war condi-
tions. Trainees are required to perform military operations 
with very little sleep. Rifle and/or handgun training ensures 
that all trainees know how to fire a weapon with accuracy 
and maintain that weapon for reliable action. Military basic 
training serves a critical purpose: It ensures that the men and 
women of the military will behave as expected when war 
occurs. Military basic training does not emphasize human 
rights or government building. As one might expect, empha-
sis is placed on killing while not being killed. Ethics such as 
“service before self” are an effort to inculcate the trainee to 
place the greater good and mission success over that of indi-
vidual needs. With such a mind-set, it should be of no sur-
prise that military members have difficulty showing kindness 
to civilians of an enemy state. Military members are best 
suited to be engaging with combatants.
Often, entities outside of the military are tasked to facili-
tate the efforts of the War on Terror. Agencies such as the 
DoD (apart from the military branches), Department of 
Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, Department 
of State, and the Department of Justice have fulfilled the mis-
sion of the War on Terror and continue to do so. In addition, 
contractors also provide a great deal of the manpower needed 
to fight this war. In fact, defense contractors outnumber 
troops in Afghanistan and have since 2007 (Brewin, 2013; 
Miller, 2007). Thus, any assessment must encapsulate the 
efforts of all these participating entities.
Assessment
Assessments should provide a data-driven method to inform 
policymakers, government agencies, and the public of how 
well resources are currently being utilized and inform deci-
sions that alter resource allocation in an effort to improve effi-
ciency. Although the value of an assessment is rarely disputed, 
the measures used in assessment are often criticized. The out-
put of a war is generally nonlinear and measures to determine 
success are often hidden and/or subjective. Political and eco-
nomic measures have long been used to determine the effec-
tiveness of the Afghan War. The results of these studies only 
serve to further cloud the true effectiveness of the Afghan War 
effort (Downs-Martin, 2011).
If the goals of the Afghan War are to change the political 
climate in Afghanistan, they have been met equally as well as 
the goals of the Vietnam War. During that era, assessment of 
the War endured a significant transition. Determining the 
value of assessment during military campaigns gained atten-
tion during the Vietnam War when the Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV) and federal agencies in the 
United States expressed their dissatisfaction of techniques 
used to acquire and analyze data prior to the Hamlet 
Evaluation System (HES). The HES was a reaction to the 
lack of validity and reliability of data obtained by the MACV 
and the Vietnam government which included subjective data 
using unreliable measures (Gayvert, 2010). The HES, started 
in 1967, was a concerted effort to collect political and insur-
gency data at the hamlet rather than the village level in 
Vietnam because it was a more accurate measure of the pop-
ulation (Gayvert, 2010). The HES was an effort to better 
assess how the campaign was truly changing the population 
at a time when U.S. government and population questioned 
the effectiveness of the war. The granularity for the HES was 
crucial because it was the hope of the American people that 
communist ideology would not take hold in Vietnam. Yet, 
the ideology of the Afghan people is not the central concern 
of the Afghan War. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has made 
it clear that the purpose of the Afghan War was to combat al 
Qaeda (Thompson, 2014). The Afghan security forces are 
tasked with continuing the pressure to keep al Qaeda at bay. 
Ideology of the people in Afghanistan is not an objective; 
thus, political measures may be an inconsistent measure.
Downs-Martin (2011) argues that major flaws plague cur-
rent methods of assessment. The flaws include the potential 
for overoptimism when military members are asked to deter-
mine whether operations are effective. As Downs-Martin 
points out, overoptimism is a favorable characteristic of 
leadership as it encourages progress, but in assessment, it can 
produce inaccurate results. Data collection, analysis, and 
depiction of trends are also areas for improvement for cur-
rent methods of assessment. Thus, data may be collected but 
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without consistency, appropriate analysis, and representa-
tion; the results can be incomplete or misleading (Downs-
Martin, 2011). In addition, assessments based on an end goal 
are particularly problematic in Afghanistan because the goal 
has shifted during the span of the war and because political 
stability is difficult to assess considering the heterogeneous 
composition of Afghanistan (Downs-Martin, 2011).
Downs-Martin (2011) argues that objective analyses of 
the complex nature of terrorism and insurgency conducted 
in a time frame that is useful are highly unlikely and con-
cludes that any “operational/strategic counterinsurgency 
assessment in Afghanistan must be subjective” (Downs-
Martin, 2011, p. 116). Yet, the need for an objective assess-
ment that accounts for the total security situation is crucial 
(Cordesman, 2015). Ineffective measures and assessments 
based only on hostile forces have resulted in short-sighted 
goals (Cordesman, 2015). This study aims to assess opera-
tional counterinsurgency operations using a cost-benefit 
analysis of casualties. As crude as it may be, body count, or 
casualties, may be one of the only measures that is rela-
tively accurate and may be most useful in determining how 
well operations are conducted.
Body count is more complex than simply the number of 
terrorists that were killed. Casualties of friendly forces, non-
combatants, and civilians negatively affect populations 
around the globe. When a parent of a fallen military member 
is informed of his or her loss, the ensuing pain of that loss is 
difficult to conceptualize. Although obvious, it is important 
to note that the pain of loss is no less for the Afghan people 
who continue to endure losses as result of this war. This 
impact on a population has the immense potential of chang-
ing the course of the War and, thus, the outcome of a cam-
paign assessment.
The Afghan People
The deaths of innocent civilians caught in the middle of war 
may be the greatest cost of the Afghan War. Shaw (2002) 
estimates the ratio of “innocent Afghan” civilians to 
American losses to be more than 1,000 to one (p. 355). The 
innocent casualties of war can be argued to be a negligible 
loss for one of two reasons. First, equal or greater losses 
would have occurred without intervention. Second, the civil-
ians’ losses are small compared with enemy losses.
Many great military members and contractors were lost in 
this War and that is a terrible price to pay, but those who 
serve know the danger of serving. When service members 
are deployed, there is no reason to believe they are out of 
harm’s way; quite literally, they are putting themselves 
directly in harm’s way. This in no way diminishes the loss of 
their lives, but their loss cannot be assumed as unforeseen. 
On the other hand, the Afghan civilians have little choice but 
to attempt to survive the conflict. The Afghan people will see 
the cost of war in their villages, government, and culture. 
Unlike military members, they are not being compensated 
for the hazards they face. It is also questionable whether the 
outcome of the War will benefit them.
In a War fought with the awesome might of the United 
States, Britain, France, and other superpowers, the Afghan 
civilians are forced to withstand and survive as bystanders. 
The greatest atrocities occur when children are killed by an 
unexploded ordnance or exposed to the toxins created when 
ammunition having depleted uranium (DU) cores have been 
reported. Unexploded ordnances can leave children crippled, 
maimed, or dead. Afghanistan from 2000 to 2002 has the dis-
tinction of experiencing the highest number of casualties in 
the world (Bilukha & Brennan, 2005). Data from the United 
Nations Mine Action Center indicate that as the number of 
casualties due to landmine detonations decreased, casualties 
caused by unexploded ordnances increased. Moreover, the 
proportion of children being injured or killed by unexploded 
ordnances increased; children accounted for 42% of all inju-
ries due to unexploded ordnances (Bilukha & Brennan, 
2005). Although the United States reports that no ammuni-
tion having DU were being used in Afghanistan, the Afghan 
people suggest they have been used and are the cause of 
increased cancer rates and birth defects (Miraki, 2006). The 
use of DU is not central to this study, but it does highlight a 
substantial and long term cost of the Afghan War.
Ghufran (2008) found that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) was having difficulty reducing insurgent activities. 
In addition, although many Taliban fighters have been 
killed, this came at a high price in the form of civilian lives. 
Ghufran identifies the dilemma of the Afghan War: Killing 
Taliban forces results in killing civilians and the killing of 
civilians is counterproductive for the Karzi administration. 
Civilian deaths result in antigovernment and anti-U.S./
coalition sentiments. Moreover, the psychological and soci-
etal costs of the massive loss of life cannot be understated. 
Similarly, war-stricken nations have reported high rates of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); 94% of children dis-
placed due to the conflict in Bosnia reported symptoms of 
PTSD (Bhutta, 2002). The widespread and staggering loss 
of life in Afghanistan is certainly detrimental to Afghan 
society, but it may also ensure that peace is less likely in the 
region. Bhutta (2002) argues that PTSD results in a cycle of 
violence. Figure 1 depicts operations in which enemies 
were engaged in Afghanistan.
Figure 1, derived from data from The Guardian, depicts 
the widespread impact of operations in Afghanistan. Southern 
areas of Afghanistan have seen the greatest concentrations of 
enemy action operations, but many operations are scattered 
around the country. Benini and Moulton (2004) found an 
“unequal distribution of civilian victims across local com-
munities” (p. 405). Many communities have no civilian 
losses, but a small portion has a great number of losses. Their 
data were relegated to Operation Enduring Freedom and 
does not extend beyond 2003, but their findings seem to be 
supported by the data in this study. Although operations in 
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Afghanistan are widespread, certain regions have far more 
violent action than others. To make the direct impact to the 
population more visible, Figure 2 depicts the population den-
sity of Afghanistan. The data depicted in Figure 2 were 
acquired from The Guardian.
As is visible when comparing the enemy action map 
(Figure 1) and the population map (Figure 2), the southeast-
ern portion of Afghanistan has a great deal of both people 
and enemy action. Thus, a greater portion of people in these 
areas have been directly exposed to war. Although northern 
areas of Afghanistan are exposed to fewer enemy action 
operations and western areas of Afghanistan are not as popu-
lated, it should be expected that the people of the area have 
had some exposure to war, albeit indirect.
War is a life-altering event for any military member. Most 
civilian Americans will never be exposed to war directly but 
may be told stories of war by a family member or friend. These 
stories often depict heroic actions of service members defend-
ing the very freedom that most Americans take for granted. 
Afghan civilians will spend generations telling the stories of 
the Afghan War. The most riveting and surviving stories will 
likely be those of human tragedy. In 2009, the U.S. military 
claimed a 28% reduction in civilian casualties due to a shift in 
strategy that included a reduction in the number of air strikes 
in populated areas (Mullen, 2010). Yet, United Nations 
Assistance Missions in Afghanistan (UNAMA) found that 
civilian deaths increased by 14% in the same period (UNAMA, 
2010). The contrary findings between the U.S. Military and 
UNAMA may be a result of different data sources or proce-
dures in obtaining data. During the Gulf War, military strategy 
attempted to reduce the number of civilian casualties and the 
impact of destroyed targets on the civilian population; yet, it 
was implementation that prevented the strategy from being 
effective (Knights, 2003). Pilots and targeteers continued to 
use overwhelming destructive power that resulted in far more 
suffering than intended (Knights, 2003). Leaked videos from 
conflicts in Afghanistan reflect the overwhelming use of force 
on targets. Such evidence, despite the possibility that these 
incidents occurred infrequently, fuels a lack of confidence for 
international forces.
Distrust and tension continue to be a concern between 
the Afghan government and international military forces 
(Mullen, 2010). This distrust should be expected to be 
shared among the civilian population via informal social 
networks. Thus, for every misstep that American missions 
take, generations of enumerable children will be told of 
these atrocities and change the very culture, the very real-
ity that these individuals impart on themselves. For this 
reason, the global community has a right to know the 
effectiveness of military troops. The global community 
will suffer the missteps of American and coalition troops 
for generations to come.
Despite the expectation that Afghans would view 
American influence as negative, a 2010 study conducted by 
the Asia Foundation found that 83% of Afghan respondents 
see the introduction of Western values as positive (Rene, 
Figure 1. Operations in which U.S. forces engaged with the enemy.
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2010). What complicates these optimistic results is that the 
Asia Foundation’s survey results also indicate most Afghans 
(62%) feel that speaking negatively about the government is 
not acceptable (Rene, 2010). In addition, corruption and nep-
otism have become rampant; this further deters the growth of 
the nation and increases the potential for an ineffective gov-
ernment (Maley, 2011).
As stated, assessment of operations in Afghanistan must 
be a measure that has a quieting effect; that is, the measure 
must be simple and objective. The most identifiable con-
sumer of the Afghan War is the Afghan people, so any assess-
ment must include the impact to the population. In addition, 
the Afghan people pay the greatest price of the War. Thus, 
the cost and benefits most affect the Afghan people. 
Americans and the U.S. government are interested in elimi-
nating terrorists who target the United States and its interests. 
Therefore, the most direct method to measure success is to 
compare the benefit, killing terrorists, against the cost, kill-
ing innocent civilians. Operations that kill or injure more ter-
rorists than civilians are a simple yet effective measure of 
success. The Afghan War was and is more than simply killing 
terrorists; it is also considered to be a humanitarian effort. 
Thus, a protection policy is inherent when one of the war’s 
goals is to help the Afghan people become and feel safe. In 
meeting this goal, forces should identify those that are 
directly affected and develop ways to protect them (Bonwink, 
2006). Using data from U.S. operations in Afghanistan, this 
study aims to address the following research question:
Research Question 1: Do operations in Afghanistan pro-
vide more good, in the form of killing more terrorists, 
rather than doing more harm by killing innocent civilians?
The following hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis 1: When engaged in operations involving 
enemy forces, civilians and friendlies are more likely to 
be wounded or killed than enemies.
Hypothesis 2: When engaged in enemy operations, 
enemy forces are more likely to be killed.
Hypothesis 3: Over time, operations have become less 
deadly for Afghan civilians.
Hypothesis 4: Killing or injuring more enemies relates to 
killing even more nonenemies (civilians and friendlies).
These hypotheses are written such that finding no support 
for Hypothesis 1 would indicate that Afghan War operations 
are less likely to kill civilians or that enemy operations are not 
related to the number of civilian deaths that occur. Support for 
Hypothesis 2 would indicate that operations in Afghanistan 
are more likely to kill enemies. On the other hand, if results 
do not support HA2, operations in Afghanistan were not 
Figure 2. Population density in Afghanistan.
6 SAGE Open
effective. Hypothesis 3 is focused on how good operations in 
Afghanistan have become in avoiding civilians over the 
course of 6 years (2004-2009). Finally, a comparison of losses 
of all operations between enemies and nonenemies (civilian 
and noncombat) is tested to address Hypothesis 4.
Method
The greatest cost of war is the loss of lives; it is also the 
greatest benefit. Dead enemies represent the benefit and dead 
civilians and friends (known as friendlies) represent the cost. 
The deaths of the innocent and the enemy can be far- 
reaching; each in their own respect. The death of a terrorist 
may act as a deterrent and could potentially stem further 
recruiting of terrorists. A death of a civilian could feed an 
antiwar sentiment, promote the agenda of the terrorists, and 
result in long-lasting societal costs.
Thus, in an effort to assess the success of military opera-
tions in Afghanistan, this study utilizes open source data from 
The Guardian on enemy and civilian casualties during com-
bat operations. Prior to 2008, no assessment plan was put into 
place, thus including data on operations during this time is 
vital. It is argued that enemy casualties represent the benefits 
of operations during the Afghan War because a ubiquitous 
goal of the Afghan War has been to eradicate al Qaeda. The 
death of noncombatant and friendlies are considered a cost of 
war. The data used in this study utilizes information reported 
on individual missions from 2004 until 2009; these operations 
culminate into a data set having 76,597 observations. 
Variables used in this study include the type of operation, year 
of the operation, the number of enemies killed, enemies 
wounded, civilians killed, civilians wounded, friendlies 
killed, and friendlies wounded. To obtain a better understand-
ing of the cost of lives affected, the sum of wounded and 
killed were calculated to obtain a total number of enemy casu-
alties. In addition, the sum of killed and wounded from civil-
ian and friendlies were calculated to represent the innocent 
lives that were impacted due to the operation. Below are the 
descriptive statistics for variables used in this study.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the number of incidents of each action when 
the type of action was recorded. Enemy action events were 
most common and compose approximately 37% (n = 27,093) 
of all incidents from 2004 to 2009. Explosive hazards, gener-
ally improvised explosive device incidents, occurred second 
most often and composed approximately 31% (n = 23,083) 
of all incidents. Counter-Insurgency events occurred least 
often of known incidents; only .06% (n = 43) of the incidents 
were of this variety. Together these incidents compose some 
74,159 operations/missions in which the U.S. Military 
engaged.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of data used in the 
empirical analysis. The unit of analysis is each incident. 
Some operations were not given a designation for the type of 
operation. In total, 76,911 incidents were recorded from 
2004 to 2009. The number of wounded and killed is the focus 
of this study. Events that resulted in the killing or wounding 
of enemies can be considered successful engagements while 
incidents resulting in killed or wounded “friendlies,” hosts, 
and civilians are considered unsuccessful engagements. Of 
particular importance is the number of innocent persons that 
were killed or wounded in respect to the number of enemies 
that were wounded or killed. An engagement may be consid-
ered successful if more enemies were killed/wounded than 
civilians. Overall, incidents have an 11% chance of resulting 
in a killed or wounded friend. Civilians are more likely to be 
killed or wounded; this occurs 17% of the time. Twenty-eight 
percent of incidents resulted in nonenemies being killed or 
wounded. On the other hand, enemies were killed or wounded 
22% of the time. The maximum number of enemies killed in 
any operation recorded is 181 persons. Sixty-seven civilians, 
27 hosts, and 16 friendlies were the maximum persons killed 
during these operations.
Empirical Results
Hypothesis 1 sought to determine whether nonenemies were 
more likely to be killed during operations when the enemy is 
engaged. A zero-inflated negative-binomial regression model 
is used instead of a Poisson regression model to account for 
the zero-heavy count data. In addition, this regression model 
was chosen over a negative-binomial regression model 
because zeros in this data represent significance rather than 
nothing. Zero losses during a military engagement is mean-
ingful, thus, the zero-inflated binomial model was chosen. 
Coefficients in these models are reported in incident rate 
ratio (IRR). Negative relationships are demonstrated with 
coefficients between 0 and 1. For example, an IRR of 0.5 can 
be read as an increase of one unit in the independent variable 
will result in a 2-unit decrease in the dependent variable.
The results, reported in Table 3, indicate that during oper-
ations in which enemies were confronted, nonenemies were 
Table 1. Military Engagement by Action.
Action Incidents Percent
Enemy 27,093 36.53
Friendly 13,734 18.52
Noncombat 7,719 10.41
Suspicious incident 208 0.28
Explosive hazard 23,083 31.13
Friendly fire 148 0.20
Detainee operation 1,208 1.63
Counter insurgency 43 0.06
Criminal event 480 0.65
Unknown incident 12 0.02
Air mission 431 0.58
Total 74,159 100.00
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more likely to be killed or wounded. With a p value of .012, 
approximately 7% more of a nonenemy is killed or injured 
when the operation targets an enemy. Stated another way, an 
additional civilian is killed after approximately 14 enemy 
engagements. This loss is not dramatic, but it is significant. 
In addition, the McFadden’s R2 is moderately high (.561), 
indicating that 56.1% variation in the deaths of civilians is 
explained by this type of operation.
In addressing Hypothesis 2, “when engaged in enemy 
operations, enemy forces are more likely to be killed,” a 
zero-inflated negative-binomial model is utilized again. The 
result of this regression is reported in Table 4. The focus of 
this regression is to determine whether engagements with the 
enemy are successful, that is, whether enemies being killed 
or wounded when the purpose of the operation is to kill ene-
mies. The result of this regression indicates that enemies are 
slightly less likely (p = .002) to be killed during enemy 
actions when compared with all other incidents. Enemies are 
11% (IRR = 0.896) less likely to be killed. The McFadden’s 
R2 is .576 indicating a moderately strong model in which 
57.6% of variation in number of enemies killed can be 
explained by enemy action under a zero-inflated negative-
binomial model.
The data used in this study spans from 2004 to 2009, a 
5-year period. Over this time, it would be expected by most 
that operations would become more effective. Gaining con-
trol of enemy territory and more accurate intelligence should 
result in more effective engagements. Thus, the Hypothesis 3 
assumes that civilians are less likely to be killed or wounded 
as the years pass. As reported in Table 5, Model one’s results 
are contrary to the assumption of fewer civilian losses. 
Afghan civilians could expect an increase of .04 of a life lost 
or a person wounded for every year that passes. To investi-
gate this further, Models 2 and 3 report the number of addi-
tional lives lost and people wounded, respectively. Model 2 
indicates that fewer Afghan civilians (IRR = 0.961) were 
killed as the years passed, but Model 3 indicates that more 
Afghan civilians (IRR = 1.057) were wounded for every 
year. McFadden’s R2 values indicate moderately strong 
model fit for all three regressions.
Although the numbers of nonenemy casualties are cer-
tainly unwanted losses, the argument could be made that 
those losses are necessary to kill or wound enemies. The 
final hypothesis in this study seeks to find the price of a 
nonenemy combatant paid in enemy combatants. The results 
of this regression assume that a nonenemy life is worth as 
much as an enemy life; it certainly could be argued other-
wise, but setting one as being more valuable and to what 
degree would be quite controversial. The results of the 
Table 2. Friends, Hosts, Civilians, and Enemy Casualties.
Variable n M SD Minimum Maximum
Year 76,911 2,007.617 1.356568 2,004 200g
Wounded 
friend
76,651 0.0951847 0.5599079 0 23
Killed friend 76,646 0.0149519 0.2089043 0 16
Wounded 
host
76,650 0.1109328 0.7542557 0 54
Killed host 76,649 0.0495245 0.4762659 0 27
Wounded 
civilian
76,649 0.1179924 1.356844 0 147
Killed civilian 76,650 0.052107 0.707894 0 67
Wounded 
enemy
76,598 0.0238126 0.4098823 0 44
Killed enemy 76,601 0.1986789 1.904452 0 181
Killed or 
wounded 
friend
76,646 0.1100253 0.6577881 0 31
Killed or 
wounded 
civilian
76,647 0.1699349 1.853638 0 189
Killed or 
wounded 
enemy
76,597 0.2224369 2.020891 0 182
Killed or 
wounded 
nonenemy
76,646 0.2798972 1.987797 0 189
Table 3. Operations Engaging an Enemy and Total Civilian 
Casualties.
IRR z p value n R2
Enemy 1.066 2.5 .012 73,243 .561
Note. Dependent variable is number of civilian deaths and injuries. A zero-
inflated negative-binomial model is used and the coefficient is reported in 
IRR. IRR = incident rate ratio.
Table 4. Operations Engaging the Enemy Impact on Total Enemy 
Casualties.
IRR z p value n R2
Enemy 0.896 −3.05 .002 73,194 .576
Note. Dependent variable is number of civilian deaths and injuries. A zero-
inflated negative-binomial model is used and the coefficient is reported in 
IRR. IRR = incident rate ratio.
Table 5. The Impact of Time on Civilian Casualties, Deaths, and 
Injuries.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV Total civilians Killed civilians Injured civilians
IV Year Year Year
IRR 1.048 0.961 1.057
z 3.1 −1.98 3.38
p value .002 .048 .001
n 73,244 73,247 73,246
R2 .592 .676 .619
Note. Dependent variable (DV) is number of civilian deaths and injuries 
and the independent varaible (IV) is the year. A zero-inflated negative-
binomial model is used and the coefficient is reported in IRR.  
IRR = incident rate ratio.
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Table 6. Impact of the Number of Enemy Casualties on the 
Number of Civilian Casualties.
IRR z p value n R2
Total enemy 1.013 3.62 .000 76,597 .562
Note. Dependent variable is number of civilian deaths and injuries. A zero-
inflated negative-binomial model is used and the coefficient is reported in 
IRR. IRR = incident rate ratio.
regression using a zero-inflated negative-binomial model 
are represented in Table 6. As the table displays, for every 
enemy that was killed or wounded, 1,013 nonenemies were 
killed or wounded. The result is significant (p = .000) and 
the McFadden’s R2 is .562.
Discussion
It has been said that every war has its casualties and every 
victory its price. As the United States draws down troops 
from the Afghan region, it is difficult to find closure since no 
victory or defeat has been evident. Results of this study are 
mixed but the results do not favor the conclusion that the 
military has been very effective in killing more enemies than 
civilians. To assess the military’s effectiveness, four hypoth-
eses were tested, each centering on civilian and enemy 
casualties.
The first hypothesis assumes that casualties, wounding or 
death, of civilians during an enemy confrontation would act 
as a disservice to the overall mission in Afghanistan. The 
results indicated that, compared with all other operations, 
civilians were more likely to become casualties during 
enemy action. Although this offers some insight into the 
effectiveness of engagements with the enemy in Afghanistan, 
it focuses only on the losses. Thus, Hypothesis 2 sought to 
determine whether enemies were also more likely to be killed 
or wounded when engaged. The results of the analysis indi-
cate that enemies have a lower likelihood of being a casualty 
when U.S. troops directly engage the enemy.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 assumed that enemy action is of pri-
mary concern when considering losses, thus Hypothesis 3 
included all operations from 2004 to 2009 in assessing 
whether U.S. operations have become safer over time. 
Results of the three models that investigated this hypothesis 
found that although the number of civilians killed decreased, 
the number of wounded increased. The result is an overall 
increase in the likelihood of a civilian casualty.
Although the previous hypotheses shed some light on the 
effectiveness of military operations, a convincing argument 
remained unchallenged. That is, although civilian lives are 
lost, the number of enemies that are killed or wounded is 
assumed to compensate those losses. Put another way, the 
number of civilian losses were considered acceptable as long 
as an increased number of enemies were killed as a result. 
Because making an assumption that a civilian or enemy life 
is worth more or less would be wrought with pitfalls, this 
study assumed that one enemy killed or wounded is worth 
the same as one civilian casualty. The results of the final 
analysis indicate that military operations kill or wound 
slightly more civilians than enemies. In any one operation, 
this would be acceptable, but this is an analysis of nearly 
77,000 operations over a 5-year period.
The results of this study have indicated that between the 
years of 2004 and 2009, civilians were more likely than ene-
mies to become casualties during operations in which the 
enemy is engaged. In addition, nonenemies have become 
slightly more likely to be wounded but slightly less likely to 
be killed. Finally, the tradeoff between enemy and civilian 
casualties favors the enemy. That is, in general, for every 
enemy casualty, more than one civilian is a casualty from 
U.S.-led military operations. The results of this study are a 
sobering reminder of the great losses in war. Assessment of 
the military’s effectiveness during the Afghan War could be 
subjective, but the data and analyses used in this study are 
purposed to be objective. Assuming that the lives of the 
Afghan people are as valuable as those of terrorists/insur-
gents, U.S. operations were not effective. Yet, this assump-
tion should not be taken lightly. In the safe confines of an 
office or home, many might argue in support of the humani-
tarian perspective so evident in this article, but for the mili-
tary members who fought this war, this perspective may not 
be practical (Slim, 2003). Actors in the war must grapple 
with their own perceptions of how much “they” are like “us” 
(Slim, 2003). Those who are spectators of the war may find 
it simple to partition enemies and civilians, but actors are 
charged with deciding upon this partition in a moment when 
their own lives are in jeopardy.
Limitations
Determining the effectiveness of complex systems can 
incite passionate arguments. This study sought to measure 
military effectiveness using variables that are less subjec-
tive: the casualties of war. Although simplistic, its purpose 
is to get to the heart of the problem; if U.S. Armed Forces 
are injuring or killing more innocent people than enemies, 
those military operations cannot be considered effective. 
On the other hand, other measures of effectiveness can be 
argued. Future research should seek more objective ways to 
measure military operations using a variety of definitions 
of effectiveness.
Data on military operations in current conflicts are diffi-
cult to obtain. This researcher could only acquire data from 
2004 to 2009. Optimally, military operations should be ana-
lyzed regularly and these results should be shared with the 
public. That is not to say that classified information should 
be available to our enemy; instead, analysis in the aggregate 
should be shared with the public. Future research should uti-
lize a larger time span of data so that more accurate findings 
can be established.
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In conclusion, it may be that the success or failure of the 
Afghan War can only be determined decades after U.S. 
Forces leave the nation. Economic and political institutions 
that serve the people remain to be fully developed and it 
could take a significant number of years before that can be 
accomplished. Thus, the story of the country of Afghanistan 
may have only just begun. In the future, U.S. operations 
could be marked as the driving force for prosperous change 
or they could be identified as the entity that caused so much 
harm to the Afghan people. This study cannot assess how the 
Afghan War has changed and will continue to change lives, 
culture, and the world, but it does imply that the cost to the 
Afghan people exceeds the costs incurred by the enemy.
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